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Mr. Watkins' work was the only arsenal of learning that was sacked. Whether
Mr. Watkins' book is cause or effect of such 'briefs we do not venture to guess.
Still soliloquizing, we wonder why Mr. Watkins has not drawn much more than
he has upon "the experience of an active practitioner" who has thought acutely, if
we may say so, upon the problems of this book. The field is his, both by reason of
his equipment and by the substantial vacuum of its literature. Mr. Drinker's
scholarly treatise is largely obsolete; and what else, of strictly legal nature, is there
to compel attention? Why, then, does' Mr. Watkins content himself with the
repetitive process and only an occasional expression of scepticism of conventional
phrases? Why does he restrict himself to the rare revelation of the insight of
which some of his Law Review papers are evidence? Let him compare his first
chapter on "State Regulation of Carriers Engaged in Interstate Commerce" with
Prof. T. R. Powell's recent essays on The Commerce Clause and State Police
Power (1921) 21 CoL L. REv. 737; (1922) 22 ibid. 28. Mr. Watkins is fully
conscious of the sonorous futilities of "the fundamental rule announced in Smyth
v. Ames" (sec. 84), yet we are denied his help in working out of the morass of
words. He tells us the factors of the problem (sec. 131) but he withholds much
that he could suggest in appraising the weight and nature of the contending
factors, and the process of their adjustment. Ticklish difficulties, life non-com-
pensatory services, are covered by quotations from authorities that have only
served to open Pandora's box.
The importance of the subject, the growing importance, needs not to be labored.
The very volume of the litigation results in diluting the professional and judicial
output. The eagerness of the courts for guiding treatises-the phrase is not too
arrogant-is amply attested by the response to Wigmore's Evidence and the quick
triumph of Williston's Contracts. The influence of independent analysis and wise
opinion upon courts, submerged by the daily grind, Mr. Watkins himself illustrates.
The Supreme Court's decision in an important case (Interstate Commerce Coin-
mission v. D. L. & W. Ry. (Ig1) 220 U. S. 235, 31 Sup. Ct 392) was surely
influenced by Mr. Watkins' discussion of bulked shipments, in his first edition.
Doubtless this work meets a demand. No less certain is it that a demand will
be found by a work that aims to help guide the stream of law-making (legislative
as well as judicial) and not merely to report its volume and velocity. And the
watchers in the lighthouses give warning, that the stream is becoming more
and more turgid and turbulent.
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Itternational Law. By L. Oppenheim. Third Edition. By Ronald F. Roxburgh.
In Two Volumes. London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1920-1921. Vol. I, pp.
xliii, 799. Vol. II, pp. xlv, 671.
The standard work of the late Professor Oppenheim now appears in a new
edition, the first since 1912. The author's labors upon it were interrupted by
death, the edition having been carried to completion by Mr. Roxburgh, who had
the advantage of the author's notes on the unfinisfied parts. The record of events
since July, igig, are the work of the editor. There is little besides this to distin-
guish the opinions of the editor from the author; the former has apparently taken
pains to preserve the author's own thoughts wherever possible. The section
numbering of the second edition seems to have been retained, new material being
embodied in interpolated fractional sections. Among this new material we find
such subjects as the law of the air and aerial navigation, the League of Nations,
the "so-called economic boycott or blockade," treaties of peace after the World
War, the "so-called long distance blockade," and other topics which the World
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War threw into relief. The old sections seem to have been thoroughly revised,
though for the most part the author's earlier opinions are retained. One notable
exception is found in the author's withdrawal of his advocacy of the ratification by
Great Britain of the Declaration of London. Whether the author fully appreciated
the fact that nations will not, if their hands are free, permit themselves to be bound
by rules which handicap them in time of war or emergency, does not clearly appear.
The emphasis placed on such important subjects as aliens, responsibility of the state
and related topics, together with detailed bibliographic references throughout,
again distinguish this work from most of the other general treatises in the field.
As a reference work for information on the general facts and history of the
science of international law, few books compare with that of Oppenheim. Whether
he will rank as high among original thinkers and scholars as the editor and others
seem to believe may be more doubtful. As an earnest, careful student and master
of research, he has few equals among the English-speaking contributors to the
science. But as a critical analytical lawyer, careful to distinguish rules de lege
lata and de lege ferenda, the reviewer believes he will not rank with Westlake or
Hall. While one cannot expect in a general treatise that exhaustive analytical
treatment of a legal doctrine which the special student demands, it yet seems to the
reviewer that the keen testing of alleged rules of international law to determine
their actual validity in law, a feature which distinguishes the work of Westlake and
Hall, is not always evident in the work of Oppenheim. For example, while the
facts connected with the series of measures instituted by Great Britian beginning
with the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, and designed to cut off Germany
from all foreign trade, are well summarized, there is practically no attempt to
consider the validity of these "measures of blockade" from a legal point of view
or to contest-as the author evidently felt he could (II, 542)-the American view
that they were "illegal and indefensible." No reference is made to Sir Samuel
Evans' remark in The Hakan (1916) 2 Br. & Col. P. C. 2IO, that the "so-called
long-distance blockade" was "iot a blockade at all except for journalistic and
political purposes," clearly indicating thereby that it was not legal. See Moore,
Principles of American Diplomacy (1918) 79. In mentioning its antecedents, the
author refers to the German war-zone decree of February 4, 1915, but does not
mention the previous British Order in Council of Nov. 3, 1914, declaring the North
Sea a closed military zone. For the detailed record of events in the Great War
it should be said, however, that the author usually refers to the well-stored work
of Professor Garner, International Law and the World War.
The occasional unsatisfactory character of the legal treatment is illustrated by
the sections dealing with private property of belligerent citizens in the enemy state.
After dealing with the rule of international law that such property is immune from
confiscation, and pointing out (II, 157) that "the last case of confiscation of
private property was that of 1793, at the outbreak of war between France and
Great Britain," he goes on (II, 159) to speak of "the readjustment of rights of
private property" under art. 297 of the Treaty of Versailles. Not once is it indi-
cated that the measures adopted by the Allies by authority of that article amount to
confiscation of private property, and that the result vitally qualifies the statements
made on previous pages. In view of these measures of confiscation of foreign
investments, the policy underlying which appears difficult to justify on the part
of trading and investing nations, it seems at least amusing to find that the Allies,
in laying down conditions for the invitation to Soviet Russia to participate in the
Genoa Conference, say: "It is not possible to place foreign capital in . . . . a
country unless the foreigners who provide the capital have a certitude that their
property and their rights will be respected and that the fruits of their enterprise
will be assured." Too often, in the reviewer's judgment, is the influence of the
Great War on the rules of law underestimated, and old rules set out as if they
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were still accepted law, e. g. in regard to the position of merchant vessels on the
outbreak of war, the doctrine of continuous voyage, and contraband. This defect
is hardly cured by the statement in the editor's preface that the "laws of war and
neutrality were admittedly in partial suspense."
The invasion of Belgium is dealt with under Intervention for Self-Preservation,
because the Germans thus defended it (I, 220.) There does not seem to be any
mention of the seizure by England of the neutral island of Madeira during the
Napoleonic Wars to prevent its falling into the hands of the French. There is no
notice, apparently, (II, 256-257) of the fact that armament on a merchant vessel
has an influence upon the ship's immunity from being sunk without warning by
submarines, yet several authorities consider this operative fact as going to the very
crux of the legal position. The League of Nations is discussed as an established
institution of international law. There is a fairly adequate citation of leading
cases, but necessarily few cases are discussed at any length.
In spite of such shortcomings as have been mentioned, the book must be
welcomed as the most up-to-date systematic standard work on international law.
EDWIN M. BORcHARD
Yale University Law School
Handbook of Practice mder the Civil Practice Act of New York. By Carlos C.
Alden. New York, Baker, Voorhis & Company, 1921. pp. vi, 34o.
As the author states, this book has been prepared primarily for the use of
students. It presents in abbreviated form the substance of those portions of the
Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the usual proceedings in an action in a court
of record, and, in addition, information abstracted from various other acts out-
lining procedure in courts not of record and in Surrogate's Courts. Much helpful
material gleaned from decisions is incorporated. By a study of this treatise a
student will acquire an understanding of the relation of the procedural legislation
to the actual mechanics of -a lawsuit, which he could never gain by the unaided
study of the Civil Practice Act and rules of court.
The work has been done so well on the whole that one hesitates to comment upon
its faults. These, such as they are, are doubtless due largely to the effort to
compress a tremendous bulk of material into so few pages. For example, in
speaking of the designation of parties in a summons, the author says on page 44:
"The use of a middle initial is proper, and affords identification, but a mistake
therein is immaterial." Where the summons is personally served, there is no ques-
tion as to the accuracy of this statement. But where service is by publication, it
is open to serious question. No doubt it is usually said that the middle initial or
name constitute no part of a person's legal name and that an error therein may be
disregarded. 29 Cyc. 265. And some cases apply this rule to published process.
White v. Himmelberger-Harrison Co. (911) 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W. 553. But
there is a tendency in the late cases to recognize the fact that the middle name or
initial is frequently the most distinguishing characteristic of a person's name and
to hold that publication of a summons designating a defendant by an incorrect
middle initial confers no jurisdiction. Gibson v. Foster (1913) 24 Colo. App. 434,
135 Pac. 121; D'Autreinont v. Anderson Iron Co. (igo8) 104 Minn. 165, II6
N. W. 357; Cartey v. Bigham (1909) 51 Wash. 452, 99 Pac. 21. Consequently, it
would seem unsafe to inform a student that he might with impunity be careless in
the use of middle initials in a summons. Again on page 51 it is said that substi-
tuted service is "in its effect substantially equivalent to personal service." It is
true that it has been held that a judgment in personam may be rendered upon such
substituted service. Continental National Bank v. Thurber (1893, N. Y. Sup. Ct)
74 Hun, 632. But rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Practice specifically provides that
after proof of substituted service has been properly filed, "the same proceedings
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